Thinking Poker

HAND 1: GUKPT Brighton Main Event 2009

This hand was really early in the event, with only one orbit gone and no significant pots played. It was all folded to a villain in mid-position who limped for 50, and I limped behind with 6-6. I could certainly have raised to 225 here for a number of reasons, but decided I was a bit far away from the button and just wanted to play a flop.

There were two more folds and then the button took a deep breath and made it 300 to play. This is a great spot for me as I really do not think the button is ‘squeezing’ here and it’s a great situation for me to flop a big hand against a potential overpair. The mid-position player calls, and I obviously call.

FLOP: Ad-6d-8h (pot 975)
The villain checked as first to act. Now I have a decision whether to bet or check to the raiser. I feel that at this point the button will be playing straightforwardly and won’t bet his J-J to K-K hands. If he has A-A I’m going broke. I am not sure of the villain’s range here, but obviously I hope someone has an Ace. I also need to get 200 big blinds in here (10k starting stacks) so I thought the best way of building a big pot would be to lead out. Also, if the button has A-Q/A-K he may be tempted to raise on such a wet flop to ‘protect’ his hand.

I bet 600 into 975. The button looked disgusted and reluctantly folded. He later said he had Q-Q. The villain insta-called. His range was still pretty wide here. He could have had an Ace, a straight draw, a flush draw or even an 8. I was just delighted to have flopped a set and was waiting eagerly to see what came on the turn…

TURN: 5h (pot 2175)
This card completed some straights and created two flush draws, so the decision for me was whether to bet or check. And if I bet, then how much? The villain checked quickly and I decided, in order to keep building the pot to an amount where I may get all-in on a river shove, I would bet 1,650 into 2,175. There would be 5,475 in the pot if the villain called and I would have 7,450 left in my stack at the river, which is annoyingly just over the pot.

I bet a bit less than full pot, thinking I still had the best hand and trying not to drive out worse hands (like an Ace). If the villain was still drawing to diamonds for example, I wanted to charge him an amount that made it a mistake for him to call, but still build the pot. In retrospect, betting a bit less is fine and can control the pot size a bit more if somehow I am beaten. This, however is a more defensive tactic that I feel loses a certain amount of value in (rare) situations like this one.

So, I bet 1,650 into 2,175 and he insta-check-raised to 4,000 straight. Seriously, fuck my life! I am against a player I know very little about and he could well have me beaten. The hands that beat me could well be the straight (as I don’t think he limps A-A or 8-8 pre-flop), so 7-9 for the open-ended straight draw on the flop and 7-4 for the gutshot draw on the flop. This would mean he would have limped in with these hands pre-flop and called a raise out of position. This is unlikely but possible.

Now, against an unknown in a GUKPT event, he could well be raising with a worse hand like a turned two pair that he thinks is the nuts, or even just top pair! This is definitely possible against some players I have played with in the early stages of a GUKPT event. I just think my hand is too strong to muck at this point. There is a last possibility that he could be bluffing (or semi-bluffing) with a hand like a pair and a flush draw, or pair and a straight draw, or total air.

I like playing live, as you get a better feel for how strong a player is and how much he likes his hand. To be honest, I am more of an online player and put more emphasis on betting patterns and frequencies. However, when playing live, you really do have the luxury to think everything through at length and look at your opponent to see if you can pick up on any, let’s say, ‘nervousness’. In this instance the villain was not giving too much away and, as I have said before, I thought my hand was too strong to fold.

So what to do? I had to call 2,350 more and the pot contained 7,825. I’ve since spoken this hand through with a number of fish (like Praz Bansi) and they were like ‘meh get it in.’ Well I decided that since I wasn’t folding, I would just call and maybe something like a diamond would peel off and he would get scared and check the river if I were beaten. Again it’s a bit defensive, as if he were semi-bluffing it would be better to commit his chips on the turn. Also, if I had him beaten, he might not want to pay me off if one of many scare cards came on the river. Anyway, I called.

RIVER: Js (pot 10,175)
The river was pretty much a blank and the villain was first to act. I had 5,100 chips left. He insta-pushed the river laying me 3/1 to call. Basically having to be right 25% of the time I finally made the call and he showed me 7h-4h for a flopped gutshot and backdoor flush draw which hit a big turn.

I basically have the philosophy that I am trying to win the tournament, and so I am keen to press all small edges early on. To balance this argument, some people may say that against a field where I have a good edge I should be avoiding playing big pots against players whose tendencies I am unsure of. Having seen the villain play really aggressively later on, I think on balance I am happy with the call. As a last note, Paul Parker said to me that he felt my man was really solid on the river (from watching him) and that maybe I could have found a fold. I would argue that I agree with Paul in that the villain wasn’t bluffing, but could well be value-owning himself with a hand that my set beat.

Hand 2: WSOP Main event 2008 (Hero Call)

It was the start of day two and I had played very well on day one to get to a 60k stack – I’d got all-in with Q-Q versus K-K and hit a Queen on the river. Brilliant. I was delighted with my table draw for day two as there were no huge or tiny stacks on show and everyone was playing quite passively. An hour passed and then another 70k stack came to the table.

He looked drunk (like a 28-year-old Bob Dylan) and had a lot of low denomination chips which made me feel he’d been playing a lot of pots. I decided to observe him for a while as I felt he may be my main threat on the table. As it happened, he donked off 25-30k in chips in the first half an hour playing very loose-aggressive poker.

So to the hand. It was folded to me in the cut-off and I raised to 1,800 at 300/600/a75 with As-7c. The rocks folded and our villain defended his big blind and called.

Flop: 10c-7h-5c (pot 4,650)
The Dylan villain checked quickly to me and I checked behind for a few reasons. Firstly, I wanted to control the size of the pot. Many draws can check-raise me here and that might put me in a tough spot, and it’s hard for me to call down here to the river if he fires multiple barrels. Also, given that he may be a bit tilted after losing some hands, I can use my A-7 as a bluff-catcher depending on what comes on the turn and river.

Turn: 10d (pot 4,650)
The turn is actually a good card for me. The board hasn’t changed dramatically and it strengthens my hand. Now the villain fires out a full pot-sized bet at me for 5,000. This surprised me a little as it really was the full pot, but given the way the hand had played out, folding was not an option. The first thought to go through my mind was obviously, ‘does he have a 10?’ Well, his bet size said to me that he didn’t want me in the hand and that he could be bluffing or semi-bluffing.

If he did have a hand better than mine (overpairs), would he not re-raise these pre-flop? He may have eights or nines but may go for a slightly different bet size with these hands. Anyway, given that folding wasn’t an option and raising seemed bad, I just called with a plan of folding some rivers and calling most.

River: 3s (pot 14,650)
The river made the final board 10c-7h 5c-10d-3s with the pot at 15k. He was first to act, and took a long time. It was about a minute during which he looked at the board, then at his hand, then at me and finally checked. Here comes the most interesting part of the hand. Initially I was thinking ‘I can show this hand down now and win a nice pot’, and I still felt I may well have the best hand here. But what hands does he have that would make him lead full pot on the turn and then check the river?

Semi-bluffs that give up, airballs that give up, monsters that are looking to check-raise, or some hands that are happier to check-call the river such as worse two-pair hands. With all that said, I decided to go for thin value on the river rather than checking. In terms of bet size, I wanted an amount that would be easy for most of his range to call me with and 7,800 into 15k seemed good.

No more than three seconds after I put the chips in, he now shoved for around 23k more. Fuck my life again! I mean, seriously? There was now a total of 53k in the pot so I was getting just over 2/1 on the call. I had to be right about 30% of the time to make the call. How many people are prepared to put all their chips on the line in the WSOP as a bluff? River check-raises are so rare and often the nuts. If I called, I would have just over 20k left so well below average, but still in the game.

Given that his line was quite strange, and given that he expects me to check behind so many of my hands on the river, why would he go for a river check-raise? It seemed to me that I would be behind so often here. Also, the size of his turn bet suggested he really wanted to end the hand there and then, and a lot of draws have whiffed. So I called and he had 4-4, figuring that he had little showdown value and needed to turn 4-4 into a bluff here.

Hand 3: London Poker Circuit 2009 (Hero fold)

This happened to be a relatively small affair which played almost like a two-table tournament, but it had a decent structure with 10k starting chips. In addition, the field consisted of some very strong players like Sam Trickett, James Akenhead and Ramsey Ajram. Karl Mahrenholz was also there. It’s tough to play against people that are familiar with your game. You can get into ‘levelling’ wars where you’re trying to outsmart each other rather than play solid poker. In this case, I think that I just ‘out-levelled’ myself. Let’s have a look at the hand…

My image had been solid up to the hand in question. We were now on the third level and I had increased my stack to 14k. We were at the 75/150 level and our table was playing seven-handed for balancing as some people had gone out. I had 7d-5d under the gun and decided to open to 400 (which seemed to be the standard raise at the table). Given that we were short-handed, I fancied playing some different hands from different positions, but I didn’t want to get ‘pegged’ too easily, so that’s why I opened this hand. Trickett called very quickly, the next to act, and Akenhead called from the small blind.

Flop: 8c-4d-2d (pot 1,350)
The flop gave me a gutshot and a flush draw. Akenhead checked and I thought they would put me on a biggish hand so my plan was to three-bet all-in. There was 1,350 in the pot and I led out for 950 hoping I would win the pot and shove if I got raised. Trickett duly obliged and raised it up to 2,450 rather quickly without much thought. The action went back to Akenhead who had a long hard think. He later said that he had the nut flush draw but he folded.

I was just about to shove when, from out of nowhere, a thought popped into my head that Trickett may be raising a bigger flush draw, in which case he was not folding and I could get it in really dominated. In my mind, when people raise the flop like this, they normally have two-pair or better, or a draw. Given that he thought I had an overpair, I figured it was unlikely that he would raise an eight or even an overpair (unless he was slow-playing Q-Q+).

The standard play for him would be just to call now with position and re-evaluate what I did on the turn. The fact that he raised suggested a set to me, as two-pair combos are unlikely.
A draw, or most likely a flush draw, were also possibilities as there were two diamonds on the flop. So now, in the heat of the moment, I confused myself. I thought I would call, and he may check behind some of his range on the turn and I could see a river and decide (depending on what it was) to bluff it or not.

So I called. I knew Trickett would give me credit for some sort of hand and we could go from there. I should really have had a better plan for later streets but I just felt my hand was far too good to fold (which is not a good enough reason).

Turn: 8d (pot 6,250)
The turn paired the board but also gave me a flush. Now what? Well, what looks like a good card for me could have me drawing dead if he’s just made a boat or a bigger flush. I thought my best option was to check and see what he did. With 6,250 in the pot, I should really be aware of what the effective stack sizes are and then again have a plan.

Trickett proceeded to bet 3,700 which I think he would with most of his range. I really wanted to fold at this point as thinking logically I couldn’t beat anything (as I really don’t think he raises an eight on the flop). But then I considered that it was Sam Trickett I was facing. The same Sam Trickett who likes to bluff a lot, and who realises that the turn card is a real scare care for a lot of my perceived range. I made the decision that I would call again and that he can’t bluff the river.

River: 6c (pot 12,650)
The river card was a 6c for a final board of 8c-4d-2d-8d-6c. I checked after a long think on the river and he immediately shoved in for his last 6,800. That made the pot 20,400 laying me 3/1 on the call (so I have to be right 25% of the time). Here’s where I think I really ‘out-thought’ myself. I felt that Trickett’s push was small relative to the size of the pot and that he was never really expecting me to fold.

He knows I am a bit of a calling station and was expecting a call. He also seemed calmer than Bob Marley on a Sunday afternoon. And what hands could he raise the flop with that need to bluff the turn and river? I mean he could have complete air but I just felt that that was so unlikely. It would essentially mean he had raised the flop with let’s say Jc-10c and then barreled two later streets.

I just felt that wasn’t happening. I was aware of the difference between the absolute strength of my hand versus the relative strength of my hand, versus his range. Given that I couldn’t see any ‘bluff’ hands I folded. He showed me 6s-7s for a gutshot on the flop that rivered a pair. Looking back, the odds were so compelling that maybe I should have just shrugged and called, but the fact that he could value-shove non-nut flushes (like Qd-Jd) made me fold.